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We compared the effects of conscious monitoring and control on motor performance. 
Participants were instructed to adopt an internal or external focus of attention in different blocks 
of a darts task. For one group, the internal as well as external focus instructions emphasized 
monitoring. For another group, the instructions emphasized control in the two focus conditions. 
Furthermore, participants’ propensity for monitoring and control was gauged via two factors of 
the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS) (Masters, Eves, & Maxwell, 2005). These 
factors were Movement Self-Consciousness (MS-C) and Conscious Motor Processing (CMP), 
which measure propensity for conscious monitoring and control, respectively. Performance 
differences between the internal and external focus blocks were expressed as mean radial error 
(MRE). Results revealed a 3-way interaction between CMP, instruction type (monitoring versus 
control) and an order effect. Only in the conscious control-group, but not the conscious 
monitoring-group was there a 2-way interaction between CMP and order. In the conscious 
control-group, participants with high CMP scores showed worse performance in whichever 
focus block (internal or external) was presented last. There were no significant effects in the 
monitoring-group or of MS-C. These findings indicate that conscious control has a stronger 
effect on motor performance than conscious monitoring. 
  





 Conscious attention plays an important role in motor performance. The theory of 
reinvestment (Masters, 1992; Masters & Maxwell, 2008), explicit monitoring theory (Beilock, 
2011; Beilock & Carr, 2001) and the constrained action hypothesis (Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2010; 
Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001) all agree that attention to movement execution decreases 
automaticity. Consequently, such an internal focus of attention may disrupt motor learning and 
performance (e.g. Beilock, 2011; Masters, 1992; Wulf et al., 2001). 
 Even though generally described as negative, internal foci may also carry positive 
effects. For example, a recent study by Zhang et al. (2016) found that mindfulness – described 
as “the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us” 
(Nyanaponika Thera, 1972, p. 5) – positively affected learning of a darts throwing task. This 
finding raises the question of what makes some internal foci distruptive to performance and 
others beneficial. 
 The effect of internally focused attention may depend on its relative emphasis on 
conscious monitoring or control. Where mindfulness exclusively involves monitoring – i.e., “a 
bare display of what is taking place” (Shear & Jevning, 1999, p. 204) – other forms of internal 
focus may involve an added desire to control – i.e., ‘manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule 
based knowledge, by working memory, to control the mechanics of one’s movements during 
motor output’ (Masters & Maxwell, 2004, p. 208). When monitored, movements are 
exclusively observed, but not necessarily influenced, whereas when controlled they are 
observed as well as influenced1. 
                                                          
1 Monitoring and control should therefore not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Rather, conscious control 
includes monitoring. Control also infers an attempt to influence movements, whereas monitoring does not. 




One method of investigating monitoring and control is via verbal instructions. Even 
though previous studies have primarily used verbal instructions to manipulate conscious 
control, it may also be possible to manipulate monitoring. For example, using a darts task, 
Lohse, Sherwood, and Healy (2010) instructed participants “Each time you throw, focus on 
[your arm/the dart] and think about [how you are moving/how it should fly]”. By slightly 
altering these instructions – e.g., by changing “think about [how you are moving/how it should 
fly]” into “be aware of how it [moves/flies]” – it may be possible to manipulate conscious 
monitoring, without incurring attempts to influence ongoing movements. 
A second way to investigate monitoring and control may be to compare how two factors 
of the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale (MSRS) (Masters, Eves, & Maxwell, 2005) 
relate to motor performance. These are Movement Self-Consciousness (MS-C) and Conscious 
Motor Processing (CMP). Using laparoscopic surgery training tasks (Malhotra, Poolton, 
Wilson, Fan, and Masters (2014); Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Leung, et al. (2015) or golf-
putting (Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Omuro, & Masters, 2015; Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, 
Uiga, & Masters, 2015) studies have found that the two factors of the MSRS have differential 
effects on motor learning and performance. These findings imply that MS-C and CMP reflect 
predispositions for different types of internally focused attention. People with high MS-C scores 
may be more inclined to consciously monitor their movements, while those with high CMP 
scores may be more inclined to consciously monitor and control their movements. 
Whether MS-C and CMP delineate conscious monitoring and control is somewhat of an 
open question. The MS-C factor (see Appendix A) emphasizes observing one’s movements – 
e.g. “I sometimes have the feeling that I am watching myself move”, whereas the CMP factor 
emphasizes further engagement with these observations – e.g. “I reflect about my movements 
a lot”. That is, MS-C more closely resembles the predisposition for conscious monitoring, while 
CMP more closely resembles the predisposition for conscious control. 




In order to verify whether MS-C and CMP delineate propensities for conscious 
monitoring and control we compared them to a gold-standard – the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS) (Brown & Ryan, 2003) (see Appendix B) – and we investigated 
whether they influence participants’ preference for either internal or external foci. The MAAS 
measures mindfulness and can therefore be used to verify whether MS-C (and not CMP) reflects 
propensity for conscious monitoring. Furthermore, participants rated their ability to sustain 
internal and external foci and whether these disturbed their performance. Congruence between 
predispositions and instructions was expected to increase sustainability and decrease perceived 
disturbance. 
 Subsequently, we combined verbal instructions and personality predispositions to 
investigate whether conscious monitoring and control have different effects on motor 
performance. It was expected that performance differences between internal and external foci 
would be greater when instructions emphasized conscious control rather than monitoring. 
Furthermore, this effect was expected to be more pronounced for participants with high CMP 
scores, because their high conscious control propensity was expected to increase the extent to 
which they engage in conscious control when instructed to do so. By contrast, MS-C and MAAS 
scores were not expected to act as moderators or to do so less strongly than CMP. 
Methods 
Ethics. Ethical approval was requested with and granted by the university’s research 
ethics committee. 
Participants. Forty-six undergraduate university students (24 male, 22 female; age M 
= 21.3, SD = 1.8 years) were rewarded course credits for their participation in the experiment. 
They had normal or corrected to normal vision and limited darts playing experience – i.e. none 
of them played or had ever played darts more frequently than once per month. They were 




randomly assigned to a conscious monitoring group (N = 23, 10 male, 13 female; age M = 21.3, 
SD = 1.7 years) and a conscious control2 group (N = 23, 14 male, 9 female; age M = 21.3, SD 
= 1.9 years). 
Apparatus. A dart board of standard size and height (bulls-eye 1.73m from the ground) 
and 3 standard darts were used. A line of adhesive tape marked the standard throwing distance 
to the dart board – 2.37 meter. To record landing positions of the darts, a Panasonic 3CCD 
HD video camera captured a frontal view of the dartboard from a vantage point at a height of 
2.5 meters and 2 meters behind the participant. Video images were processed using Matlab 
version 2012a. Statistical analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20. An 
MSRS (Masters et al., 2005) was used to capture MS-C and CMP scores and a MAAS to capture 
mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003) 
 Procedure. Participants received a verbal explanation of the procedure and, after 
signing informed consent, they were positioned behind the throwing line with their feet and 
shoulders aligned parallel with the direction to the target. Participants adopted this position 
throughout the experiment. They were granted three practice throws to familiarize themselves 
with the task. 
 All participants performed 4 blocks of 45 throws each, aiming at the bulls-eye. As in 
regular matchplay darts, they used a set of three darts, which they removed from the board 
themselves after every 3rd throw. In the first block, participants were not given any instructions. 
Before the second and third block, they received focus instructions (see Appendix C) adapted 
from Lohse et al. (2010), which were designed to manipulate focus of attention (internal versus 
external) as well as attention quality (monitoring versus control). In a conscious monitoring 
group, the internal and external focus instructions emphasized that participants should be aware 
                                                          
2 Not to be confused with a vernacular control group. 




of their arm movements or of the flight of the dart, respectively. In a conscious control group, 
the internal and external focus instructions emphasized that participants should attempt to 
produce a pre-determined ideal arm movement or ideal dart flight, respectively. The order of 
the internal and external focus blocks was counterbalanced between- and randomized within 
groups. 
During the blocks, participants received brief, verbal reminders of the relevant 
instructions. These reminders were provided after every 6th throw when they were removing 
their darts from the board. After the second and third block, participants completed visual rating 
scales (see Appendix C) regarding how well they were able to sustain the instructed focus and 
whether the focus disturbed their performance by indicating a position on a 10cm line that 
ranged from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’. The fourth and final block was identical to the first 
block, such that no instructions were provided. After the fourth block, participants indicated on 
a 10cm line ranging from ‘completely internal’ to ‘completely external’ whether the focus they 
had adopted in the first block and then in the fourth block was relatively more similar to the 
internal or external focus condition (see Appendix C). During the final part of the experiment, 
participants completed the MSRS (Masters et al., 2005), the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and 
were verbally debriefed. 
 Data handling and statistics. Internal consistency of the MAAS, MSRS and its 
subscales was determined based on the Crohnbach’s alpha statistic. A linear regression was 
calculated to evaluate the associations between the MAAS and the MS-C and CMP subscales 
of the MSRS. As MS-C and the MAAS may reflect the same construct – conscious monitoring 
propensity – each analysis involving conscious control propensity was carried out twice: Once 
using MS-C and once using the MAAS. Whether MS-C or MAAS was used only marginally 
changed the effects of other variables. Therefore, the reported results are those using MS-C 
scores. 




Performance was expressed as mean radial error (MRE), with lower MRE indicating 
better performance. The performance difference between the internal and external focus blocks 
served as main outcome. 
The effects of the instructions (monitoring versus control), the two factors of the MSRS, 
the MAAS, the order (internal block first versus external block first) as well as their interactions 
were tested using a stepwise multiple linear regression. The stepwise method was chosen, 
because the number of potential effects (4 main effects, 6 two-way interactions, 4 three-way 
interactions and 1 four-way interaction) was large. Effects on the ability to sustain the instructed 
focus of attention, perceived performance disturbance and focus of attention adopted in the first 
and last block we tested by multiple linear regressions using the enter method. 
Results 
Questionnaires. Except for 2 participants, who did not complete the MAAS, all 
participants completed both questionnaires. On average, participants answered between 
“weakly disagree” and “weakly agree” on the MSRS – MS-C (M = 3.74, SD = 1.01), CMP (M 
= 3.72, SD = .97) – and between “somewhat frequently” and “somewhat infrequently” on the 
MAAS (M = 3.82, SD = .59). There were no significant differences in MS-C, CMP or MAAS-
scores between the conscious monitoring and the conscious control group (ps > .51).  
The internal consistency of the MAAS was acceptable to good (α = .802), as was that 
of the MSRS (α = .811) and its subscales MS-C (α = .788) and CMP (α = .772). MS-C and 
CMP showed a significant association ( = .33, t(44) = 2.30, p = .03, sr2 = .10). A linear 
regression revealed that a model including MS-C and CMP significantly predicted MAAS 
scores (F(2, 41) = 3.83, p = .03, R2 = .16). However, only MS-C ( = .34, t(41) = 2.24, p = .03, 
sr2 = .10) was significantly associated with MAAS score, while CMP was not ( = .13, t(41) = 
.89, p = .38, sr2 = .02). 




Subjective experiences. In the first and the last block, higher CMP scores were 
associated with a tendency to adopt an internal rather than an external focus of attention. In the 
first block, CMP had a marginally significant effect on the focus that participants naturally 
adopted ( = -.28, t(43) = -1.85, p = .07, sr2 = .07), whereas neither MS-C ( = -.17, t(43) = -
1.11, p = .27, sr2 = .02) nor the MAAS ( = -.03, t(43) = -.17, p = .86, sr2 < .001) had an effect. 
In the last block, CMP had a significant effect on focus ( = -.32, t(43) = -2.07, p = .04, sr2 = 
.09), whereas MS-C ( = -.001, t(43) = -.006, p = .99, sr2 < .001) and the MAAS ( = .08, t(43) 
= .51, p = .61, sr2 < .01) still had no effect. Except for a marginally significant effect of CMP 
on participants’ perceived ability to sustain an external focus of attention ( = -.27, t(43) = -
1.76, p = .09, sr2 = .06) – whereby higher CMP scores were associated with a decreased ability 
to sustain an external focus – no significant effects were found of MS-C, CMP or the MAAS 
on perceived ability to sustain or disturbance by internal or external foci. 
 Performance. Stepwise linear regressions with MRE difference between internal and 
external focus as dependent variable and with MS-C (or the MAAS), CMP, instruction type 
(monitoring versus control), order and their interactions as predictors revealed a 3-way 
interaction between CMP, instruction type and order (F(1, 44) = 4.59, p = .04, R2 = .10), ( = 
.31, t(44) = 2.14, p = .04, r2 = .10) (see Figure 1). None of the other variables significantly 
predicted the performance difference between internal and external focus (ps > .10). 
 Further exploration of the 3-way interaction revealed a 2-way interaction between CMP 
score and order ( = .70, t(21) = 4.54, p < .001, sr2 = .50) in the conscious control group, but 
not the conscious monitoring group ( = .03, t(21) = .15, p = .88, sr2 < .01). Under instructions 
that emphasized conscious control, participants with higher CMP scores tended to perform 
better in whichever focus of attention condition (internal or external) occurred first, and worse 
in whichever focus occurred last. If the internal focus block occurred first, CMP scores were 




associated with better performance in the internal compared to the external focus condition ( 
= .66, t(10) = 2.76, p = .02, sr2 = .43). Conversely, if the external focus block occurred first, 
CMP scores were associated with better performance in the external compared to the internal 
focus condition ( = -.79, t(9) = -3.80, p = .004, sr2 = .62). 
 
Fig. 1. The 3-way interaction between CMP, instruction type and order. Higher MRE difference between 
internal and external focus corresponds with a better performance in the internal focus block. 
Discussion 
 We investigated the effects of conscious monitoring and control on the performance 
differences between internal and external foci. To this end, novice participants engaged in a 
darts task in which they were instructed to adopt an internal and external focus of attention in 
different blocks. One group received the internal and external focus instruction with an 
emphasis on conscious monitoring, whereas the emphasis of the other group’s instructions was 
on conscious control. Monitoring and control were furthermore observed using two factors of 
the MSRS (Masters et al., 2005) – MS-C and CMP, which were thought to operationalize 
propensity for conscious monitoring and control, respectively. This ability of the MS-C and 




CMP factors to delineate propensities for conscious monitoring and control was scrutinized by 
comparing their associations to the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) as well as a number of 
subjective experiences regarding: preferred focus, the ability to sustain foci and perceived 
disturbance to performance. 
 The comparisons of the MSRS to the MAAS as well as the subjective experiences 
provided some indication that MS-C – rather than CMP – reflects the propensity for conscious 
monitoring and that CMP – rather than MS-C or the MAAS – may reflect the propensity for 
conscious control. In particular, the finding that MS-C correlates significantly with MAAS 
scores – whereas CMP does not – indicates that MS-C reflects an ability to be self-aware 
without necessarily intervening. That said, it should be acknowledged that the association 
between MS-C and the MAAS was relatively weak, indicating that no conclusive inference can 
be made. Furthermore, the fact that MS-C and CMP showed a weak association with each other 
indicates that the two factors are not entirely separate and suggests that CMP partially captures 
conscious monitoring as well as a desire to interfere in the control of movements. In line with 
this conjecture, the subjective experience measures indicated that CMP had a larger influence 
than MS-C on the ability to sustain and the preference for an internal focus. Although these 
results do not provide irrevocable proof, they do resonate with the notion of Malhotra, Poolton, 
Wilson, Omuro, et al. (2015), Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Uiga, et al. (2015), Malhotra, Poolton, 
Wilson, Leung, et al. (2015) and Malhotra et al. (2014) that MS-C reflects monitoring, whereas 
CMP reflects conscious control. 
 Surprisingly, the effects of control (i.e., conscious control instructions and CMP scores) 
interacted with the order in which the instructions were presented, rather than - as was expected 
- a preference for an internal focus of attention regardless of order. This finding has multiple 
possible explanations. Given that conscious control is based on ‘manipulation of conscious, 
explicit, rule based knowledge’ (Masters & Maxwell, 2004), it may be speculated that the 




knowledge used for conscious control differs between internal and external foci. As a result, in 
the second focus block: (1) extra effort or time may have been needed to replace knowledge 
from the first focus block; (2) cumulative knowledge accrual may have increased the burden on 
working memory capacity; (3) old and new knowledge may have contracted or conflicted with 
each other; (4) mental fatigue may have depleted participants’ cognitive resources after an 
extended period of manipulating knowledge in the first block. As these explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, they may all partially explain the order effect. Needless to say that the scope 
of this study does not afford definite conclusions regarding the nature of the order effect. 
 Regardless of the unexpected manner in which motor performance was influenced, it 
remains the case that conscious control - and not conscious monitoring - exerted this influence. 
CMP and conscious control instructions interacted to predict whether performance would drop 
in the second focus block. By contrast, neither MS-C nor the monitoring instructions showed 
significant effects. In line with Malhotra, Poolton, Wilson, Leung, et al. (2015), the results of 
this study therefore indicate that conscious control had a more pronounced influence on motor 
performance than conscious monitoring. 
 In conclusion, results of the current study suggest that conscious monitoring and 
conscious control are two different types of internally focused attention, with different effects 
on motor performance. This notion is supported not only by the effects of personality 
predispositions and verbal instructions separately, but by a convergence between the two. While 
monitoring leaves motor performance unaffected – or may sometimes even influence it 
positively (Zhang et al., 2016) – conscious control appears to disrupt motor performance, as 
predicted by the theory of reinvestment (Masters & Maxwell, 2008), explicit monitoring theory 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001) and the constrained action hypothesis (Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2010). 




 This study opens multiple avenues for further study. For example, the study only 
included novice participants. As the immediate effects of attentional focus may depend on 
expertise (Perkins-Ceccato, Passmore, & Lee, 2003), further research is necessary to determine 
the effects of conscious monitoring and control in experts. To follow-up on the surprising order-
effect, the burden on working memory caused by switching attentional focus could be 
investigated using secondary-tasks (Masters, 1992; Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000). 
Furthermore, replication studies are needed to validate whether verbal instructions can 
distinctively induce monitoring and control. Verbal protocols – methods for determining 
criterion validity of verbal instructions (e.g. Liao & Masters, 2001; Maxwell, Masters, & 
Poolton, 2006) – could not be used in this study, as they assess the amount of verbal knowledge 
used in a motor task, not the exact nature of this knowledge. Future work could employ brain 
imaging techniques (e.g., EEG, NIRS) to provide a more objective verification of instructions 
designed to manipulate focus of attention. The weak correlation between MS-C and CMP also 
suggests that the factors discriminant validity can be improved. Lastly, it would be reassuring 
to know that the confluence of personality predispositions and conscious control manipulations 
is replicable. 
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 Internal focus instructions External focus instructions 
Conscious monitoring 
group 
Each time you throw, 
visually focus on the target, 
and mentally focus on the 
motion of your arm and be 
aware of how it moves. 
 
Each time you throw, 
visually focus on the target, 
and mentally focus on the 
motion of the dart and be 
aware of how it flies. 
 
Conscious control group Each time you throw, 
visually focus on the target, 
and mentally focus on the 
motion of your arm and think 
about how it should move. 
 
Each time you throw, 
visually focus on the target, 
and mentally focus on the 
motion of the dart and think 
about how it should fly. 
 
 
Visual rating scales after the 2nd and 3rd blocks 
On the line below, please indicate how well you were able to adopt / sustain the instructed 
focus 
 








Visual rating scales after the 4th block 
On the line below, please indicate whether during the first block your focus was more similar 
to the internal or to the external focus 
 
 
On the line below, please indicate whether during the last block your focus was more similar 
to the internal or to the external focus 
 
 
 
 
 
